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Abstract. We discuss a simple version of the Minority Game (MG) in which agents
hold only one strategy each, but in which their capitals evolve dynamically according
to their success and in which the total trading volume varies in time accordingly.
This feature is known to be crucial for MGs to reproduce stylised facts of real market
data. The stationary states and phase diagram of the model can be computed, and
we show that the ergodicity breaking phase transition common for MGs, and marked
by a divergence of the integrated response is present also in this simplified model. An
analogous majority game turns out to be relatively void of interesting features, and
the total capital is found to diverge in time. Introducing a restraining force leads to a
model akin to replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, and we demonstrate
that here a different type of phase transition is observed. Finally we briefly discuss
the relation of this model with one strategy per player to more sophisticated Minority
Games with dynamical capitals and several trading strategies per agent.
E-mail: Tobias.Galla@manchester.ac.uk, yi-cheng.zhang@unifr.ch
1. Introduction
The statistical mechanics of the Minority Game (MG) in its original version is now
well understood. Since its conception [1] sophisticated tools from equilibrium and
non-equilibrium statistical physics have been applied to this simple model of inductive
adaptation, and the phase diagram and behaviour in the ergodic regime have been
thoroughly studied [2, 3], see also [4]. The model is now essentially considered to be
solved and its key observables can be calculated either fully exactly or at least in good
approximation, even though some challenging mathematical issues are still not fully
resolved and deserve further attention [3]. These relate mainly to the development and
‡ TG’s permanent address is at the University of Manchester.
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refinement of dynamical theories to address MGs and related market models with so-
called real histories and to the behaviour of the model in the non-ergodic, turbulent
regime, where satisfactory analytical solutions are as yet still awaited.
With the main analytical tools to study MGs now well developed and in place one
possible future direction appears to be the extension of present basic versions of the
MG towards more realism as a market model while at the same time maintaining the
analytical tractability of the original setup. The goal is here to study versions of the
MG which are able to capture features of real market data, so-called stylised facts, such
as non-Gaussian return distributions or volatility clustering.
The main drawback of the original MG, preventing the emergence of stylised facts, rests
in the assumption all agents contribute equally to the total outcome, they trade one
unit of the underlying asset at any time step of the dynamics, regardless of their success
or otherwise in the trading. This results in a constant trading volume in time (given
simply by the number of players). It has been demonstrated in that a modulation of the
overall trading volume in the MG can suffice to obtain stylised facts. Two alternative
approaches have been proposed to allow the trading value to be dynamic. In so-called
grand-canonical MGs (GCMG) [5] agents are endowed with a null strategy and can
decide not to trade at a given time step if they do not consider trading profitable.
Hence the total trading value varies in time. The GCMG has been found to exhibit
volatility clustering and non-Gaussian return distributions in a critical region around
its phase transition. On the other hand GCMGS are tractable fully analytically and
their phase diagrams and order parameters in the ergodic regime have been computed.
A second option is to endow each agents in the MG with an individual capital, which
may vary in time. Such MGs have been introduced in [6], here agents are equipped with
multiple trading strategies and a dynamical capital, which evolves according to their
success in trading. It is then assumed that any agent trades a constant fraction of his
capital at any time-step, so that the overall trading volume again varies over time. The
analysis of [6], based on numerical simulations, shows that such an MG with dynamical
capitals and multiple strategies per player again exhibits stylised facts, provided model
parameters are tuned suitably.
The aim of the present paper is to study the most simple MG with evolving capitals,
namely one in which every agent only holds only one trading strategy, but in which at
the same time the agent’s capital and her trading volume changes in time according
to her success in the past. The traders are thus zero-intelligence agents, or simple
automata following a strategy pre-set at the beginning of the game, and with no power
to take any decisions or to alter their behaviour during the course of the game. Allowing
for a dynamics of the weights of each trading strategy here introduces an evolutionary
mechanism, selecting more successful strategies over time. We here address two different
types of dynamics. The first part of the paper is concerned with a minority game
with dynamical capitals. To obtain non-trivial dynamics we consider a setup in which
agents with dynamical capitals (so-called ‘speculators’) are coupled to a background of
‘producers’, that is traders who trade constant volumes, even if in the long-run they
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run losses. The addition of producers to a population of speculators is common also in
GCMGs [2, 3]. Secondly, we then focus on Majority Games within a similar setup of
dynamical capitals (here there is no need to consider producers), and then finally we
show that a close relation between replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory [14]
and the minority and majority games with dynamical capitals can be drawn. The
payoff structure of the minority/majority game here leads to a replicator model with
Hebbian/anti-Hebbian couplings. Extending the work of [7] we study these models by
means of dynamical approaches of disordered systems theory, and derive the properties
of their stationary fixed point states as well as their phase diagrams. We find that the
common MG-phase transition between an efficient and a non-efficient phase persists in
the setup of the MG with evolving capitals and only one trading strategy per player.
The majority game with dynamical capitals is relatively featureless, but a different type
of transition is found in the corresponding replicator dynamics. Ergodicity is broken
in model the MG with evolving capitals and in the majority game replicator dynamics,
but no divergence of the dynamic susceptibility is found in the latter case. While we
focus on the statistical mechanics properties of both models, we also briefly address the
emergence of stylised facts in this simple MG with dynamical capitals, and leave a more
detailed discussion to future work [8].
2. Minority Game with dynamical capitals
2.1. Model
We consider a system of N agents, labelled by i = 1, . . . , N . At each round of the game
each agent makes a bid that can be either positive or negative, and which depends on
a common external signal, which is available to all agents In the simple setup of one
‘trading strategy’ per agent, the sign of agent i’s action is determined by his strategy
vector ai, which maps the value of an external piece of information onto the binary set
{−1, 1}. The common random external information is here represented by an integer
number µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , P} and is drawn from a flat distribution over this set at each time
step without temporal correlations. Thus, each trading strategy ai, i = 1, . . . , N can
be understood as a vector ai = (a
1
i , . . . , a
P
i ) ∈ {−1, 1}P , mapping information µ onto a
trading decision of sign aµi . We will assume the amount agent i trades at time step t to
be proportional to her capital at that time, denoted by ci(t) ≥ 0. More specifically we
will assume that agent i trades a constant fraction ε ∈ [0, 1] of her capital. The total
bid or so-called excess demand A(t) and the total trading volume V (t) at time t are
therefore given by
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
εci(t)a
µ(t)
i , V (t) =
N∑
i=1
εci(t), (1)
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where µ(t) is the piece of information presented to the agents at t. From (1) a return
r(t) and price process of the underlying asset and can be defined as follows [6]:
r(t) =
A(t)
V (t)
, log p(t+ 1) = log p(t) +
A(t)
V (t)
, (2)
p(t) is here the price of the asset at time t.
In a minority game setup the gain for agent i can be written as
gi(t) = −aµ(t)i (t)εci(t)
A(t)
V (t)
, (3)
where we follow [6]. Other definitions have been proposed for example in [9, 10].
We now split the population of N agents into two types, Ns so-called speculators which
we will label by i = 1, . . . , Ns, and Np = N−Ns producers, labelled by i = Ns+1, . . . , N .
The capitals of the speculators will be assumed to evolve in time according to their
trading success,
ci(t+ 1) = ci(t) + gi(t)
= ci(t)
[
1− εaµ(t)i
A(t)
V (t)
]
, (4)
where we again follow [6].
Producers are taken to be agents whose capitals are drawn from a fixed distribution at
the start of the game, and which then do not evolve in time. The group of producers
thus provides a background signal on which the speculators operate and try to make
profit.
The evolution of the capitals of the speculators can then be written as follows
ci(t+ 1) = ci(t)
[
1− ε
V (t)
∑
j
a
µ(t)
i a
µ(t)
j εcj(t)
]
, i = 1, . . . , Ns (5)
A(t) = ε
N∑
i=1
ci(t)a
µ(t)
i V (t) = ε
N∑
i=1
ci(t) (6)
The capitals of the producers i = Ns + 1, . . . , N remain constant in time.
Finally, following the standard MG conventions we take the number P of different values
of the external information µ(t) to be proportional to N , the total number of players.
The ratio α = P/N will then be the key control parameter of the model, along with the
fraction p = Ns/(Ns + Np) of producers among the total population of N = Ns + Np
agents.
The key observables we will be interested in in the following are the average capital
of the agents and the so-called predictability of the market. We will write 〈. . .〉spec
and 〈. . .〉prod for averages over the speculators and producers in the following, i.e. for
example
〈c〉spec = N−1s
Ns∑
i=1
ci, 〈c〉prod = N−1p
N∑
i=Ns+1
ci (7)
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for the average capitals of the speculators and producers respectively. Since the capitals
of the producers do not evolve in time, the latter quantity depends only on the
distribution from which the producers weights are drawn at the start of the game.
Following the standard MG conventions [2, 3] the predictability H will be defined as
follows§
H = (PN)−1
αN∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 , (8)
where 〈. . . |µ〉 denotes an time-average conditional on the occurrence of information
pattern µ. A non-vanishing value of H thus indicates an inefficient market, in which
the sign of the excess demand can be predicted statistically given the knowledge of the
state of the world µ. H = 0 corresponds to a situation where no such information can
be extracted from the time series of price changes generated by the model.
2.2. Analytical solution
2.2.1. Effective macroscopic theory An analytical solution of the model can be obtained
using either a static approach based on replica techniques or secondly by directly
studying the dynamics via generating functionals. Both approaches have been used
extensively in the MG literature [2, 3], we here restrict the discussion to the dynamical
approach, and quote only the main intermediate steps and final results.
The starting point is the so-called batch dynamics of the model
ci(t+ 1)− ci(t) = −εci(t)
v(t)
[
1
N
αN∑
µ=1
aµi a
µ
j cj(t) + h(t)
]
, i = 1, . . . , Ns (9)
where an effective average of the on-line process Eq. (4) over all values of the external
information µ ∈ {1, . . . , αN} has been performed at each time step, and where time
has been re-scaled appropriately (see [3] for details regarding this batch limit). h(t) is a
perturbation field introduced to generate response functions, and will be set to zero at
the end of the calculation. v(t) in (9) is the (re-scaled) total trading volume at time t
v(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ci(t). (10)
The final outcome of the generating functional analysis of this batch process is an
effective theory valid in the limit N → ∞ (at fixed α = P/N, p = Np/N) and
characterised by a non-Markovian single-agent stochastic process of the form
c(t+ 1)− c(t) = −εc(t)
v(t)
[
α
∑
t′≤t
(1I +G)−1tt′ c(t
′) +
√
αη(t)− h(t)
]
, (11)
§ In principle an additional normalisation with respect to the trading volume given µmight be desirable
here. This would not however change the qualitative behaviour of H as a function of the model
parameters, so that we here stick to the definition (8).
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from which the dynamical order parameters are to be determined self-consistently as
C(t, t′) = (1− p) 〈c(t)c(t′)〉⋆ + p
〈
c2
〉
prod
, (12)
G(t, t′) = (1− p)∂ 〈c(t)〉⋆
∂h(t)
, (13)
v(t) = (1− p) 〈c(t)〉⋆ + p〈c〉prod. (14)
Here 〈. . .〉⋆ denotes average over the Gaussian noise {η(t)}, which in turn comes out to
be correlated in time according to the following co-variance matrix
〈η(t)η(t′)〉⋆ =
[
(1I +G)−1C(1I +GT )−1
]
tt′
. (15)
Since this matrix is defined through the above correlation and response functions C
and G the set of equations (11-15) form a closed, but implicit characterisation of the
dynamics of the model on the macroscopic level. This effective theory is exact in the
thermodynamic limit in the sense that a combined site and disorder average in the
original problem, 〈· · ·〉spec is equivalent to the average 〈. . .〉⋆ in the resulting effective-
agent description.
2.2.2. Fixed point analysis We will now restrict the further analysis to an inspection of
the fixed points of the effective process (11). At the fixed point the correlation function
becomes flat
C(t, t′) ≡ q, (16)
and we assume that the response function is invariant against time-translation G(t, t′) =
G(t− t′) in this regime. The static order parameters will be given by q, the asymptotic
average capital v = limt→∞ v(t) and the integrated response χ =
∑
τ≥0G(τ). The
single-particle noise {η(t)} is then assumed to become static as well at the fixed point
so that limt→∞ η(t) = η with η a time-independent Gaussian random variable of zero
mean and variance q/(1 + χ)2. For simplicity we will write η =
√
q
1+χ
z in the following,
with z a standard Gaussian. Taking into account that all fixed points of (11) are to be
non-negative, i.e c ≥ 0, we find
c(z) = −
√
q
α
zΘ[−z], (17)
with Θ[x] the step-function, Θ[x] = 1 for x > 0 and Θ[x] = 0 otherwise. The
perturbation field h(t) has been set to zero, as announced above. In particular we
note that precisely half of the speculators will go bankrupt asymptotically (i.e. their
capitals decay to zero), whereas the other half survives.
Recalling p = Np/(Ns +Np)) self-consistency demands
v = (1− p) 〈c〉∗ + p〈c〉prod, (18)
q = (1− p) 〈c2〉∗ + p〈c2〉prod (19)
χ = − (1− p)1 + χ√
αq
〈
∂c
∂z
〉
∗
, (20)
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from which one finds
q =
p〈c2〉prod
1− 1−p
2α
, (21)
v = (1− p)
√
q
2piα
+ p〈c〉prod, (22)
χ =
1− p
2α + p− 1 . (23)
These equations fully characterise the statistics of the assumed fixed point, given the
model parameters α and p and the first two moments 〈c〉prod, 〈c2〉prod of the capitals of
producers. From these solutions, the predictability H at the fixed point is then given
by
H =
q
(1 + χ)2
, (24)
for a derivation of analogous expressions in conventional MGs we refer to [2,3]. With a
suitable re-scaling H and v become independent of the distribution of producer wealth,
in particular one has
v′ ≡ 〈c〉spec√
〈c2〉prod
=
√
p
2piα
(
1− 1−p
2α
) , (25)
H ′ ≡ H√
ε2 〈c2〉prod
=
p(
1− 1−p
2α
)
(1 + χ)2
, (26)
with χ as given in (23).
2.3. Phase transition and stationary states
We will now briefly discuss the statistical properties of the stationary states of the model
and its phase diagram. Our analytical predictions for the order parameters of the model
in it ergodic stationary states are verified by numerical simulations in Fig. 1.
Firstly one notes that the phase transition observed in the standard versions of the
MG [2, 3] also occurs in the present model. In particular we observe a phase with
vanishing predictability at low α, and a second phase with H > 0 at values of α above
the transition point. Our theory predicts the integrated response χ to diverge at a
critical value of α
αc =
1− p
2
, (27)
at which the predictability H vanishes. Below this point the system remains in a state
of zero predictability and divergent integrated response so that the predictions of the
ergodic theory are no longer expected to be valid.
The occurrence this transition between a phase in which the market is predictable H > 0
and a regime in which H = 0 may be interpreted geometrically as follows: any stationary
Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator dynamics 8
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Figure 1. (colour on-line) Re-scaled wealth v′ = 〈c〉spec /
√
〈c2〉prod of the speculators
and re-scaled predictability H ′ = H/(ε2
〈
c2
〉
prod
) versus α for fixed p = 0.5, and
two different distributions of the wealth of producers. Solid lines are the theoretical
predictions for the phase above the transition at αc = 0.25 (indicated as vertical
dashed line). Symbols are from simulations of the on-line process; circles correspond
to producers with unimodal capital ci ≡ 1, squares to an exponential distribution of
the producers’ capitals. Simulations are for αN2 = 10000, run for 106 steps (with
measurements only in the second half of this period). Averages over 20 samples of the
disorder are taken.
solution {ci}i=1,...,Ns of the dynamics which renders H = (αN2)−1
∑
µ
(∑N
i=1 a
µ
i ci
)2
to
zero necessarily fulfills the P conditions
Ns∑
i=1
aµi ci = −
N∑
i=Ns+1
aµi ci (28)
for µ = 1, . . . , P = αN . The values on right-hand-sides are quenched random variables,
as the only dynamical degrees of freedom are given by the capitals of the speculators.
Within the ergodic theory Ns/2 of the variables ci, i = 1, . . . , Ns are equal to zero as
seen above, so that this defines a linear set of αN equations for Ns/2 = (1 − p)N/2
unknowns. For α > (1 − p)/2 the number of conditions thus outnumber the degrees
of freedom so that no solution with H = 0 can be found in this regime. Only as
α = αc = (1 − p)/2 does the number of conditions become small enough to allow for
solutions with vanishing predictability H . Below αc such solutions will generally not be
unique, hence the breaking of ergodicity as indicated by the divergence of the integrated
response.
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Some other observations can be made at this point
(i) the numerical values of the order parameters v and H depend only on fraction of
producers p and show a simple dependency on the first two moments of wealth of
the producers, apart from which the distribution of the weights of the producers
is irrelevant. The location of the phase transition in turn only depends on the
relative proportions of producers and speculators. This is consistent with [6] where
no dependence of the critical point on the functional form of the distribution of
producer wealth and only small qualitative variation of the order parameters was
reported for the model with dynamical capitals and two trading strategies per agent.
(ii) the analytical theory for the infinite system predicts the average capital of the
speculators 〈c〉spec = (v − p 〈c〉prod)/(1 − p) to diverge at the phase transition. In
numerical simulations of finite-size systems we thus expect a rounded maximum,
as confirmed in Fig. 1. We note that very similar behaviour is found in the model
with two trading strategies per player [6].
(iii) Inspection of Eq. (9) reveals that the role of ε in the batch dynamics is essentially
to set the overall time scale. In simulations ε needs to be sufficiently small though
to ensure that all capitals remain positive at all times. While the deterministic
batch dynamics attains a fixed point in the long-run, this may not necessarily be
true for the on-line game. Here dynamical fluctuations are to be expected due to
the inherent stochasticity induced by the randomly chosen information patterns
µ(t). The magnitude of these dynamical fluctuations in the agents’ capitals is here
governed by ε.
2.4. Stylised facts
We now turn to a brief discussion of the statistics of the price time series generated by
the model. In [6] it has been reported that an MG with dynamical capitals and two
trading strategies per player leads to non-Gaussian price-return distributions close to
criticality. This is confirmed in the present simpler model with only one trading strategy
per player, as shown in Fig. 2. While the distribution of returns is essentially Gaussian
far above the phase transition, extended tails of large price changes similar to those
observed in real market data develop as αc is approached from above. In analogy to
GCMGs in which stylised facts persists throughout an entire critical region, these non-
Gaussian effects are observed throughout the efficient phase of the model at α < αc.
We would here like to stress that the examination of the emergence of stylised facts
in the simplified MG with evolving capitals is not the focus of this paper. We have
therefore not studied the auto-correlation of price returns, or the question as to whether
the above non-Gaussian return distributions are indeed a finite-size or transient effect.
Further insight might here also be expected from a study of the on-line dynamics with
evolving capitals [8].
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α=0.27 
α=0.2
Figure 2. (colour online) Probability distribution of returns r(t) = A(t)/V (t),
normalised to unit variance. Data is shown for α = 1., 0.4, 0.27, 0.2 at p = 0.5 (for
which αc = 0.25). All simulations are for N = 100 agents, run for 10
6 (on-line) steps,
measurements taken in the second half of this interval. Data is from 1000 samples of
the disorder. The data at α = 0.2 contains transients.
3. Majority Game with dynamical capitals
A majority game with evolving capitals can be defined via the following process
ci(t+ 1)− ci(t) = εci(t)
v(t)
1
N
αN∑
µ=1
aµi a
µ
j cj(t), i = 1, . . . , N, (29)
where the only difference compared to the above minority game is the sign of the
interaction term. There is no need to introduce producers here, in fact the majority game
is a positive-sum game by definition, and simulating the dynamics of (29) unsurprisingly
does not produce much excitement. What is observed as that the total capital grows in
time without bound, and simulations soon reach their limits and need to be abandoned
after a relatively small number of time steps. One should note that this does not imply
that the capitals of all traders grow to infinity, asymptotically, but rather we find that
some capitals diverge, whereas others appear to tend to zero asymptotically ‖.
Introducing a forcing term, parametrized by λ > 0 as follows
ci(t+ 1)− ci(t) = εci(t)
v(t)
[
1
N
αN∑
µ=1
aµi a
µ
j cj(t)− λ
]
(30)
yields a more interesting behaviour, see Fig. 3. At small, but non-zero values of λ
the behaviour is as before, the total capital in the system diverges in time. If a large
‖ Due to the discreteness of the dynamics at finite ε, some capitals will become negative eventually,
and simulations are aborted at this point.
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Figure 3. (Colour on-line) Behaviour of the majority game with evolving capitals,
and external forcing term (α = 0.316, ε = 10−4, N = 100). We show results from
single simulation runs, the red (light) curves show the evolution of the capitals of 10
randomly selected agents, the blue (dark) curves the average capital. In the left panel
the forcing parameter is low (λ = 1), so that the average capital grows without bounds.
In the right panel the forcing parameter λ = 3 is sufficiently strong to suppress the
growth of capitals, and the system approaches a trivial state with all capitals vanishing.
enough value of the limiting force is chosen, however, then simulations suggest an overall
contraction of the total capital, i.e. limt→∞ v(t) = 0. This suggests, that a non-trivial
stationary regime may be possible, if λ is chosen appropriately to balance the forces
between asymptotically diverging, and asymptotically vanishing total capital in the
system. This then directly leads to so-called replicator dynamics, used frequently in
evolutionary game theory and in population dynamics. We will therefore discuss the
behaviour of these equations in the context of the majority game with evolving capitals,
subject to an overall conservation, in the next section.
4. Replicator dynamics
4.1. Model definitions
Replicator equations are a common mathematical framework in evolutionary game
theory [14], and generally describe the dynamics of populations of agents, in which each
individual, carries one single (pure) strategy. We will label strategies by i = 1, . . . , N in
the following. The interaction with the other players then leads to a fitness or payoff fi
for strategy i. Here a well-mixed interaction with all other members of the population
is assumed. If xi is denotes the proportion of individuals carrying strategy i in the
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population, then the replicator dynamics are given by
x˙i(t) = xi(t)(fi[x(t)]− f [x(t))]). (31)
We have here explicitly included the frequency-dependence of fi (i.e. fi depends on
the entire composition x = (x1, . . . , xN) of the population). f [x(t)] is the average
fitness in the population, i.e. f [x] =
∑
i xifi[x]. Provided the concentration vector x is
normalised when the dynamics are started, i.e.
∑
i xi(t0) = 1, this normalisation will
be maintained at all later times. Further details on replicator dynamics in the context
of evolutionary game theory can be found for example in [14]. It is now not difficult to
see the analogy with the dynamics discussed above in the context of the majority game
with evolving capitals. The {ci} play the role of the concentrations {xi}, for convenience
and consistency with the replicator literature, we will use xi from now on. The fitness
of a given strategy ai in a population of composition x is then given by
fi =
1
N
∑
j,µ
aµi a
µ
j xj (32)
in the context of the majority game. Introducing
Jij =
1
N
αN∑
µ=1
aµi a
µ
j (33)
and the using the convention of vanishing diagonal elements Jii = 0, we then use
d
dt
xi(t) = xi(t)
[
−2uxi(t) +
∑
j
Jijxj(t)− λ(t)
]
. (34)
as a starting point for our analysis. Note here that the strategy concentrations have
been re-scaled and normalised to N−1
∑
i xi(t) = 1. This guarantees a well-defined
thermodynamic limit. The first term in the square brackets has been introduced
following [7, 15–18], and describes what is referred to as ‘co-operation pressure’. It
has been seen in the context of [7, 12, 17] that large positive u drive replicator systems
towards the centre of the strategy simplex, and one expects a stable fixed point at
which all strategies are played with equal frequency. For low values of u the dynamics
can approach the boundary of the simplex, and a sizable fraction of strategies is not
used at all asymptotically. While we leave u as a general model parameter, it is worth
pointing out that for the choice u = −α/2, Eq. (34) is precisely the replicator dynamics
corresponding to the majority game. λ(t) is again the average fitness (now given by
λ = N−1
∑
ij Jijxixj), and can be treated as a general Lagrange multiplier maintaining
the overall normalisation ¶.
¶ Strictly speaking the normalisation is only conserved as a soft constraint in our analytical calculation,
i.e. N−1
∑
i xi(t) = 1 holds as an average over the disorder. In our simulations the constraint is
respected for each sample.
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4.2. Analytical solution
The model defined above is closely related to that studied in [7], but with an opposite
overall sign in the Hebbian-type dynamics. As we will see the resulting phase diagram
is different from that of the model of [7] however. Analytical progress can be made
using again the formalism of dynamical mean-field theory. Similar to [7,17] we find the
following effective single-species process:
d
dt
x(t) = x(t)
[
− 2ux(t)− αx(t) + α
∫
dt′(1I +G)−1(t, t′)x(t′) +
√
αη(t)− λ(t)
]
, (35)
where
〈η(t)η(t′)〉⋆ =
[
(1I +G)−1C(1I +GT )−1
]
tt′
, (36)
and the corresponding self-consistency relations
C(t, t′) = 〈x(t)x(t′)〉∗ , G(t, t′) =
〈
δx(t)
δλ(t′)
〉
∗
, 〈x(t)〉∗ = 1 (37)
Following [7, 17] we will next look for fixed points of this effective stochastic process.
These fulfill
x
[
− 2ux− α χ
1 + χ
x+
√
αη − λ(t)
]
= 0, (38)
i.e. one has x = 0 or
x =
√
αη − λ(t)
2u+ α χ
1+χ
(39)
We will write η = −
√
αq
1+χ
z with z a standard Gaussian, and similar to what was proposed
first in [17] for a replicator model with Gaussian couplings we use the physical ansatz
x(z) =
−√αq
1+χ
z − λ
2u+ α χ
1+χ
Θ
[
−
√
αq
1 + χ
z − λ
]
(40)
to proceed, i.e. one has
x(z) =
√
αq
1 + χ
∆− z
2u+ α χ
1+χ
Θ [∆− z] (41)
where ∆ = −λ/
√
αq
1+χ
. From this, following the lines of [7, 17] one derives the following
self-consistent equations for the static order parameters χ (the integrated response as
before), q = 〈x2〉∗ and the asymptotic disorder-averaged Lagrange multiplier λ
−
[
2u+ α
χ
1 + χ
]
χ = f0(∆) (42)
1 + χ√
αq
[
2u+ α
χ
1 + χ
]
= f1(∆) (43)
(1 + χ)2
α
[
2u+ α
χ
1 + χ
]2
= f2(∆) (44)
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Figure 4. Phase diagram of the replicator model. The line separating the stable
and unstable phases is obtained within a linear stability analysis. At the transition
precisely half of the initially present strategies carry non-zero weight asymptotically,
i.e. one has φ = 1/2. In the unstable phase the system may still approach fixed-points
asymptotically, but the number of different attractors is exponential in the system size
(see also [16–18] for related systems).
with fn(∆) = (2pi)
−1/2 ∫ ∆
−∞ dz e
−z2/2(∆−z)n. In the fixed-point regime q and λ are time-
independent, and χ is a stationary order parameter by definition. Using (42,43,44) these
order parameters can be obtained numerically as functions of the model parameters u
and α.
Before we present results in the next section, it is worth investigating the stability of
the fixed-points which we have assumed to derive the above closed equations describing
the stationary state. The stability can here be determined within a linear expansion
about the assumed fixed-point. This is performed on the level of the effective process
and follows the lines of [17,18]. We will not present the details of the calculation here, a
result similar to [7,17] is found: at large values of u greater than a critical value uc(α),
the above solutions is indeed stable and valid. Below uc the system may still approach
a fixed point asymptotically, but generally the dynamics allow for a large number of
attractors and none of the fixed points is locally stable, as perturbations do generally
not decay [16]. As in [17,18], for each α the transition point uc coincides with the point
at which φ = 1/2, i.e. one here has ∆ = 0. Using this condition, uc is then determined
numerically from (42,43,44) (solving these equations delivers q = 1/pi at u = uc along
with a value for χ at the transition, which we do not report here).
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Figure 5. (Colour on-line) Order parameter 1/q as a function of α for the replicator
model at different values of the co-operation pressure. Simulations (markers) are
performed for N = 500 agents, averaged over 50 samples, and using a discretisation
of the replicator equations as proposed in [18]. Solid lines are from the theory in the
stable phase, continued as dashed lines into the unstable region, where the theory is
no longer valid.
4.3. Stationary state and phase diagram
The resulting phase diagram is shown in Fig. 4. The line shows the onset of instability
in the (α, u) plane. It is here also worth noting that (42,43,44) do not allow for a
divergence of the susceptibility χ. This is prevented for example by Eq. (42): given
that f0(∆) is finite and bounded in the interval [0, 1] for all ∆, assuming a divergence
of χ, i.e. |χ| → ∞ directly leads to u = −α/2 < 0. Given that an instability of the
fixed point occurs at a positive value uc(α) when the co-operation pressure is lowered
from large positive values, such a divergence of χ never occurs in the physical system +
The validity of the generating functional theory is confirmed in Figs. 5 and 6, where we
show results for the order parameters 1/q and H as a function of α for different choices
+ We here note that the transformation u → −u turns the present model into that discussed in [7],
but with an overall minus sign in front of the right-hand side of the replicator dynamics (corresponding
to t → −t). In [7] a transition with a divergence of the integrated response was found at α = u/2, in
particular this transitions occurs when u is lowered from a stable fixed point state at u > α/2. Due to
the inversion in signs, stability properties are also inverted in comparison to the model discussed here,
so that what used to be a stable fixed point regime is now unstable, and no such transition is seen in
the present model.
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Figure 6. (Colour on-line) The analogue of the predictability H as function of α for
the replicator model at different values of the co-operation pressure. Markers show
results from simulations (same parameters as in Fig. 5). Solid lines are from the
theory in the stable phase, continued as dashed lines into the unstable region, where
the theory is no longer valid.
of u. At small values of α, where the theory is predicted to be stable and accurate, near
perfect agreement between theory and simulations is observed. Only at large value of α
does the fixed point ansatz become unstable, and we find systematic deviations. Fig. 5
here demonstrates that the asymptotic diversity of the system decreases as α increases.
To this end note that 1/q is similar to what is known as Simpson’s index [11] in ecology,
and a measure of how many distinct species (i.e. strategies) survive in the long run.
In the extreme case of only one surviving strategy (with concentration x = N) one
has q = N , so 1/q → 0 in the thermodynamic limit. On the other hand, if all species
contribute at equal concentration, xi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N , then q = 1. Fig. 6
shows that the predictability H remains strictly positive for all studied values of u and
α, again confirming the absence of a transition with diverging integrated response and
of a phase with vanishing predictability and optimal resource exploitation. In Fig. 7
we characterise the nature of the instability transition depicted in the phase diagram
of Fig. 4 further. To this end we have, for a fixed choice of the disorder (i.e. for fixed
strategy assignments ai) started the system from two different initial conditions x(t = 0)
and x′(t = 0), and have then monitored the distance d2(t) = 1
N
∑
i(xi(t)− x′i(t))2. The
figure shows results at long times, and re-scaled suitably by a factor of q. As seen in
the diagram, the asymptotic distance vanishes at large values of u, greater than the
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Figure 7. (Colour on-line) Sensitivity to initial conditions as measured by the distance
between runs at fixed choices of the random disorder, but started from different initial
conditions (see text for further details). Markers show results from simulations (same
parameters as in Fig. 5), and are connected for optical convenience. The vertical lines
mark the location of the phase transition and onset of instability, as predicted by the
theory.
critical uc predicted by the theory, but remains non-zero below. We conclude that
initial conditions are irrelevant in the stable phase, and that the replicator dynamics
converges to a single unique fixed point for any realisation of the disorder. Below the
transition, multiple attractors are possible, and which of these is chosen is determined
by the initial conditions from which the dynamics is started. Transitions of this type
have been related to what is called ‘memory onset’ in MGs [13] in [7, 12].
Finally, one may wonder whether it is possible to study the minority game with
dynamical capitals as well in the context of replicator dynamics. This is of course
the case, and leads to a replicator model, essentially with an inverted sign in front of
the Hebbian interaction term in (34). This model, termed replicators with Hebbian
interactions, has been studied in [7]∗, so that we do not pursue this here, but only
mention that both types of transitions (one with diverging integrated response, and one
indicated by a continuous onset of memory) are observed in this case.
∗ In light of the present study it would probably be more appropriate to refer to the model of [7]
as replicator dynamics with anti-Hebbian couplings (corresponding to a minority game), and to the
present model as one with Hebbian couplings (majority game).
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5. Discussion and concluding remarks
In summary our study demonstrates that the minority game with dynamical capitals
put forward in [6] can be simplified to a model with only one trading strategy per player
without losing many of the features of the more complicated model in which every
agents holds two strategies. In particular the transition between a symmetric phase at
low values number of available information patterns, and an asymmetric phase at large
value of the key model parameter α remains. The theoretical analysis of the simpler
model is straightforward and can be performed without much technical effort based
on the standard methods discussed in the literature [2, 3]. As in many other variants
of the minority game the dynamic susceptibility (or integrated response) diverges at
this transition. Simulations in both the simplified and the original model with evolving
capitals reveal a maximum of the average wealth per speculator at the phase transition
point. Our analytical calculations show that this quantity diverges in the infinite system
at the transition, the maximum observed in simulations is a reflexion of this in finite
systems. At the same time the model can lead to non-Gaussian wealth distributions
around and below the transition.
We have then furthermore briefly discussed a majority game with evolving capitals. The
dynamics of this model is relatively unspectacular, unless forced by an external decay
term, the total capital in this positive-sum game grows without bounds, and diverges
asymptotically. Unless a mixture of minority and majority game players is considered
(which we have not done here) non-trivial dynamics in the majority game with evolving
capitals can only be expected if a suitably chosen Lagrange multiplier is introduced,
keeping the total wealth constant in time. This established an immediate connection
to replicator dynamics with interactions of the Hebb type. Such models can be studied
with the same analytical methods, and the analysis reveals that a different type of
transition is observed in such circumstances. While no divergence of the integrated
response and no symmetric phase with vanishing predictability is found, a dynamical
instability separating a regime with one unique stable fixed point from a second phase
with multiple attractors can be identified. Initial conditions are seen to be irrelevant in
the stable phase, but determine the choice of attractor below the instability.
To conclude let us mention that future work might be concerned with the
characterisations of the differences between on-line and batch minority game models
with evolving capitals. The simple model discussed in the first part of this paper
might provide a suitable starting point, and first steps in the direction of addressing
the corresponding on-line game have been taken in [8]. Progress can here probably
be made using the tools discussed in [3], where on-line versions of the minority game
have been addressed, even though more basic approaches might suffice in the context
of the simple model discussed here. Secondly, one may think of mixed minority and
majority games [19] with dynamical capitals, and investigate whether these show a phase
transition, even if each agent is equipped only with one strategy. Finally, the MG with
dynamical capitals and multiple strategies per player can be expected to be accessible
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by dynamical and static methods as well as pointed out in [6], although the analysis
appears here much more intricate due to the interplay of slowly-evolving capitals and
fast spin degrees of freedom characterising which of their strategies the individual agents
chose to play. While the derivation of a description of the effective dynamics within the
generating functional formalism of dynamical mean field theory seems straightforward
(but tedious) the subsequent analysis of the resulting effective process is likely to involve
some type of adiabatic approximation to disentangle the different time-scales of the two
types of degrees of freedom.
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